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Teaching GuideTerm Faculty of Economics and Business |
| Grao en Economía |
 Subjects |
| European Industrial Organisation |
| Contents |
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| Identifying Data | 2020/21 | |||||||||||||
| Subject | European Industrial Organisation | Code | 611G01033 | |||||||||||
| Study programme |
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| Descriptors | Cycle | Period | Year | Type | Credits | |||||||||
| Graduate | 1st four-month period |
Fourth | Obligatory | 6 | ||||||||||
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| Topic | Sub-topic |
| CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE GAME THEORY |
Optimal decision and rational choice: the mathematical model of conditioned optimization Interdependence between decision-makers: cooperative and non-cooperative games Games and human conflict: strictly competitive and mutually beneficial games |
| CHAPTER 2: NASH-COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM FOR NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES |
Best response matches: graphic representation in two-person games with two strategies. Discussion of significant examples Nash equilibrium in finite games: Nash theorem Backward induction and credible threats. Nash equilibrium refinements. Perfect equilibrium in subgames Equilibria in games with incomplete information. Bayesian equilibria |
| CHAPTER 3: REPEATED GAMES. THEOREMS AND PARADOX | Repeated games: Basic concepts and examples. Paradoxes in single equilibrium games with a finite and certain horizon: Prisoners' Dilemma and Warehouse Chain Games with an infinite or uncertain horizon: Trigger and Retaliation Strategies. Multiple equilibria and Folk Theorem |
| CHAPTER 4: INCENTIVES, COLLECTIVE SYSTEMS AND COMPETENCE | The tragedy of commons: overexploitation of resources Incentives and effort offer in collectivist systems Property rights and contracts: competition as a game with efficient cooperative results |
| CHAPTER 5: STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND COMPETITION MODELS | Competition in quantities: Cournot models. Perfect competition as a limit to quantity competition among a large number of companies Price competition: Bertrand models Competition in quantities and prices |
| CHAPTER 6: GAMES IN STAGES. LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES FOR ENTRY. |
Stackelberg Leadership and Models Reinterpretation in terms of capacity: credible commitments and strategic advantages of established companies Barriers and deterrence of entry The Limit Price Strategy |
| CHAPTER 7: CARTELS AND COLLUSION IN OLIGOPOLIES | Promises and threats. Credible reward and punishment strategies. Collusion in Bertrand models: prices and medium-term incentives. Monopoly prices and perfect Pareto equilibria Collusion in Cournot Models: Monopoly Amounts and Perfect Pareto Equilibria Information and collusion mechanisms between oligopolists: discussion of the stability of cartels and the possibilities of antitrust policy |
| CHAPTER 8: MONOPOLY AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND REGULATION | Third degree discrimination. The inverse rule of elasticity Second degree discrimination First degree discrimination. The consumer surplus and the competitive solution. Monopoly regulation. Flexible regulation in the EU |
| CHAPTER 9: PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION | Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation |
| CHAPTER 10: VERTICAL RELATIONS. NETWORKS AND PLATAFORMS | Double marginalization Vertical control Relation exclusivity Networks and platforms |
| CHAPTER 11: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY | Copyrights Patents Trademarks Intellectual property: international character |
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