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Teaching GuideTerm Faculty of Economics and Business |
Guía Provisional
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| Grao en Economía |
 Subjects |
| European Industrial Organisation |
| Contents |
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| Identifying Data | 2024/25 | |||||||||||||
| Subject | European Industrial Organisation | Code | 611G01033 | |||||||||||
| Study programme |
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| Descriptors | Cycle | Period | Year | Type | Credits | |||||||||
| Graduate | 1st four-month period |
Fourth | Obligatory | 6 | ||||||||||
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| Topic | Sub-topic |
| CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY | • The problem of interdependence between decision-making agents, and the conditional optimization decision. • Non-cooperative versus cooperative games • Types of non-cooperative games according to the nature of the interaction (static, dynamic or repeated), as well as the information available (perfect/imperfect or complete/incomplete). • Formal definition and representation of a game in normal and extensive form. |
| CHAPTER 2: NASH EQUILIBRIUM FOR NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES |
• Best response correspondence. Dominant strategies. • The Nash equilibrium. Existence of Nash equilibrium. Interpretation and efficiency: the prisoner's dilemma. Other resolution concepts: the maximim. • Representative examples. • Equilibria with continuous functions of best response. • Oligopolies with complete information in action: Cournot; Bertrand. |
| CHAPTER 3: GAMES IN STAGES. LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES FOR ENTRY. |
• Definition of extensive games with perfect or imperfect information. • Subgame perfect equilibrium. Backward induction and credible threats. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium. • Leadership in oligopolies: Stackelbert in quantities and prices. • Other models of leadership: reinterpretation in terms of capacity and strategic advantages of established companies. • Barriers to entry and entry deterrence. The limit price strategy. |
| CHAPTER 4: PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES | • Horizontal differentiation. Hotteling's model. • Vertical differentiation. • Advertising and related marketing strategies. Packaging of products and services. |
| CHAPTER 5: EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION | • Introduction and examples. • Characterization of a Bayesian game. Bayesian equilibrium. • Oligopolies with incomplete information in action: Cournot and Bertrand. |
| CHAPTER 6: REPEATED GAMES | • Basic concepts and examples. • Paradoxes in unique equilibrium games with a finite and certain horizon: prisoners' dilemma and warehouse chain. • Games with an infinite or uncertain horizon: trigger and retaliation strategies. • Multiple equilibria and Folk theorem. |
| CHAPTER 7: COOPERATIVE GAMES. CARTELS AND COLLUSION IN OLIGOPOLIES | • Cooperative games. Applications • Collusion in oligopolies: solutions in quantities and prices, and perfect Pareto equilibria. • Information mechanisms and collusion between oligopolists: discussion of stability. • Different penalty strategies and credibility strategies. • On cartels and the possibilities of antitrust policy. |
| CHAPTER 8: EXTENSIONS | • Network economies and digital platforms • Intellectual property |
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