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Teaching GuideTerm Faculty of Economics and Business |
| Grao en Economía |
 Subjects |
| European Industrial Organisation |
| Contents |
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| Identifying Data | 2022/23 | |||||||||||||
| Subject | European Industrial Organisation | Code | 611G01033 | |||||||||||
| Study programme |
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| Descriptors | Cycle | Period | Year | Type | Credits | |||||||||
| Graduate | 1st four-month period |
Fourth | Obligatory | 6 | ||||||||||
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| Topic | Sub-topic |
| CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY | Optimal decision and rational choice: the mathematical model of conditional optimization The interdependence between decision-making agents: cooperative and non-cooperative games Games and human conflict: strictly competitive games with mutual gains |
| CHAPTER 2: NASH-COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM FOR NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES |
Best response matches: graphic representation in two-person games with two strategies. Discussion of significant examples Nash equilibrium in finite games: Nash theorem Backward induction and credible threats. Nash equilibrium refinements. Perfect equilibrium in subgames Equilibria in games with incomplete information. Bayesian equilibria |
| CHAPTER 3: REPEATED GAMES. THEOREMS AND PARADOX | Repeated games: Basic concepts and examples. Paradoxes in unique equilibrium games with a finite and certain horizon: Prisoners' Dilemma and Warehouse Chain Games with an infinite or uncertain horizon: Trigger and Retaliation Strategies. Multiple equilibria and Folk Theorem |
| CHAPTER 4: GAMES IN STAGES. LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES FOR ENTRY. |
Leadership and Stackelberg model Reinterpretation in terms of capacity: credible commitments and strategic advantages of established companies Barriers and entry deterrence The limit price strategy |
| CHAPTER 5: PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION | Horizontal differentiation. Hotteling's model Vertical differentiation Advertising and related marketing strategies Packaging of products and services |
| CHAPTER 6: CARTELS AND COLLUSION IN OLIGOPOLIES | Promises and Threats: Credible Reward and Punishment Strategies Collusion in Bertrand models: prices and incentives in the medium term Monopoly prices and Pareto perfect equilibria Collusion in Cournot models: Monopoly Quantities and Pareto perfect equilibria Information mechanisms and collusion between oligopolists: discussion of the stability of cartels and the possibilities of antitrust policy |
| CHAPTER 7: MONOPOLY AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: TRIGGERS OF INTERVENTION | Monopoly regulation: Flexible regulation in the EU The new competition tool (NCT) in the EU Underlying theories of damage (harm) Intervention activators. Casuistries and indicators. |
| CHAPTER 8: NETWORK ECONOMIES AND DIGITAL PLATFORMSS | Networks and platforms Scale and network effects Monopolistic competition in platform economies Multihoming vs. Singlehoming |
| CHAPTER 9: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY | Copyrights Patents Trademarks Intellectual property: international character |
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